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E D I T O R I A L
Rethinking performance benchmarks in kidney transplantation
Transplantation is a highly regulated field. Transplant centers answer 
to local, regional, and national authorities responsible for ensur-
ing that patients have access to providers who give them the best 
chance at a good outcome. It is plausible that these efforts have con-
tributed to improvements in kidney transplant outcomes over time. 
One- year patient and graft survival in the United States (US) both 
now exceed 93%. Perhaps just as important, outcomes are more 
consistent. In one recent study, short- term survival rates following 
deceased donor kidney transplant only differed by 3% between low- 
and high- performing centers.1
In a recent article published in AJT, Bowring et al. present an anal-
ysis of kidney offer acceptance rates for transplant centers partici-
pating	in	Systems	Improvement	Agreements	(SIA).2 The Centers for 
Medicare	and	Medicaid	Services	(CMS)	designed	SIAs	as	a	final	stop-
gap for centers that accrue multiple performance flags related to sub-
standard patient and graft survival. The authors demonstrated a 5.9% 
decrease	 in	 kidney	 offer	 acceptances	 at	 centers	 subjected	 to	 SIAs	
compared to controls matched on waitlist volume. This was driven, in 
large	part,	by	a	significant	decrease	(−12.3%)	in	acceptance	rates	for	
high quality offers (KDPI 0- 40). Because of the rigorous study design, 
it	is	reasonable	to	conclude	that	the	effects	of	SIA	on	transplant	cen-
ter acceptance practices are largely independent of donor/recipient 
factors and overall secular trends in organ acceptance rates.
On one hand, adopting a more selective approach to organ 
offers is a rational response for programs looking to improve 
 performance. Transplant centers reduce acceptance rates when pre-
sented with a performance flag and these practice changes appear 
to be  reasonable—acceptance rates for high- risk donors tend to fall 
first.3 While their approaches will differ, most centers subjected to 
performance flags do improve their outcomes.4 On the other, im-
plementing more restrictive acceptance practices have unintended 
consequences. The independent benefits of incremental increases in 
selectivity alone are unclear and more aggressive practice changes 
may have diminishing returns. Patients miss out on organs that could 
offer them the best chance at survival. Bowring and colleagues iden-
tified a troubling decrease in acceptance rates for high- quality offers 
for	centers	exposed	to	an	SIA.
This article raises questions about how transplant centers 
response to regulatory policies and whether the incentives for 
performance improvement reflect the changes currently most 
relevant to transplant centers and their patients. Present day 
outcomes following deceased donor kidney transplantation are 
consistently	good.	As	 it	becomes	harder	 to	differentiate	 centers	
based on one- year patient and graft survival, the focus should 
shift towards other domains of quality. It is also possible that 
understanding what distinguishes adequate from exceptional per-
formance is no longer possible under the current framework and 
methodology.
Assume	that	a	transplant	center	subjected	to	a	performance	ci-
tation increases one- year graft survival from 92% to 99%—shifting 
them from a low- to high- performing designation. However, in order 
to accomplish this marked “improvement,” that center accepted 20% 
fewer kidney offers and, as a result, did 10% fewer transplants each 
year. The marginal benefit of performance improvement is unclear, 
especially when considering its effect on other important problems 
facing patients with end stage renal disease. The singular focus on 
patient and graft survival stifles other opportunities to improve 
outcomes. For example, organ discards and acceptance rates vary 
widely. Shifting incentives to reduce variation in these outcomes can 
result in a large survival benefit for patients on kidney transplant 
waitlists.1
In this context, the transplant community’s role in addressing 
kidney disease should be viewed from societal or population health 
perspective. There is a significant survival benefit of transplantation 
for the vast majority of patients. Policies designed to reduce waitlist 
mortality, minimize kidney discards and offer turn- downs, and maxi-
mize recovery of organs do not need to be at odds with existing stan-
dards to optimize posttransplant survival. In order to reflect these 
priorities, it will be necessary to change payment systems in order 
to optimize the care of a regional cohort of patients with end- stage 
renal disease. To this end, relevant work is already underway. ESRD 
Seamless Care Organizations (ESCO) integrate systems of providers 
caring for patients with kidney disease.5,6 Incentivizing population- 
based approaches that includes transplant care can align initiatives 
designed to improve access with novel value- based reimbursement 
strategies.
There are several ways in which policy changes such as this 
can be studied to ensure that they produce the desired outcomes. 
One option would be a pilot program within one of the eleven 
organ procurement operations (OPO) with a single transplant 
center. This would allow for alignment of transplant and recovery 
operations under the new incentive structure. Selecting a trans-
plant center with exemplary survival outcomes would mitigate 
some of the potential risks associated with shifting incentives to-
wards	other	metrics.	Alternatively,	it	may	be	beneficial	to	pursue	a	
pilot program in a large OPO with multiple centers. There are four 
OPO’s with 10 or more kidney transplant centers. It is difficult to 
predict how each would respond to the policy changes. However, 
this may facilitate creativity and a better understanding of the 
potential risks associated with new quality benchmarks.
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Changes like this are daunting but continuing to push for greater 
improvements in survival for kidney transplantation is counterpro-
ductive. Short- term survival outcomes no longer reflect the great-
est problems facing kidney transplant patients. Testing new quality 
benchmarks in this population will have spillover effects to practices 
for other solid organ transplants. Finally, aligning the current and 
most relevant problems with appropriate performance benchmarks 
is the best way to optimize the care of patients with kidney disease 
in the US.
DISCLOSURE
The authors of this manuscript have no conflicts of interest to dis-
close as described by the American Journal of Transplantation.
Keywords
donors and donation, donors and donation: incentives, editorial/








R E FE R E N C E S
1.	 Schold	JD,	Buccini	LD,	Goldfarb	DA,	Flechner	SM,	Poggio	ED,	Sehgal	
AR.	Association	between	kidney	transplant	center	performance	and	
the survival benefit of transplantation versus dialysis. Clin J Am Soc 
Nephrol.	2014;9(10):1773‐1780.
2.	 Bowring	 MG,	 Massie	 AB,	 Craig‐Schapiro	 R,	 Segev	 DL,	 Hersch	
Nicholas L. Kidney offer acceptance at programs undergoing a 
Systems	Improvement	Agreement.	Am J Transplant. 2018. https://doi.
org/10.1111/ajt.14907.
3. White SL, Zinsser DM, Paul M, et al. Patient selection and volume in 
the era surrounding implementation of Medicare conditions of partic-
ipation for transplant programs. Health Serv Res. 2015;50(2):330-350.
4.	 Schold	 JD,	 Buccini	 LD,	 Poggio	 ED,	 Flechner	 SM,	 Goldfarb	 DA.	
Association	 of	 candidate	 removals	 from	 the	 kidney	 transplant	
waiting list and center performance oversight. Am J Transplant. 
2016;16(4):1276‐1284.
5. Hippen BE, Maddux FW. Integrating kidney transplantation into 
value- based care for people with renal failure. Am J Transplant. 
2018;18(1):43-52.
6. Maddux FW, Ketchersid TL. The journey to full health care re-
sponsibility for one ESCO provider. Clin J Am Soc Nephrol. 
2017;12(12):2050‐2052.
